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Will There Be a Science of Law in the Twenty-First
Century ?*
RICHARDSTITH, J.D., Ph. D.
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University
Indiana
ABSTRACT

n e skepticism of the American
Legal Realists and their heirs
threatens to make a politically
neutral science of law impossible
and thus to undermine the liberal
polity which needs such a science.
Ronald Dworkin attempts to refute
the skeptics and defend both legal
theory and liberalism. However,
the author points out, Dworkin
and liberalism are themelves
skeptics when it cornes to moral
principles, and, therefore, they
cannot wholly escape from similar
skepticism with regard to legal
principles. Both Anglo-American
and Continental legal history are

Le scepticisme des théoriciens de
l'école réaliste américaine et de
leurs disciples compromet
l'élaboration d'une science
juridique non partisane,et, par
conséquent, menace E'Etat libéral
qui a besoin de cette science.
Ronald Dworkin tente de réfuter
les arguments des sceptiques et
vient à la défense tant du
libéralisme que de la théorie du
droit. Toutefois, l'auteur souligne
que Dworkin et la pensée libérale
font eumêmes preuve de
scepticisme à l'égard des valeurs
morales et ne peuvent donc s é n
départir entièrement à l'égard des

* This essay is a revised versionof a lecture originally delivered in Spanish tu the Tenth
Conference on the General Science of Law, held November 4, 1988, in Vaiparaiso, Chile,
on the topic "The Science of Law in theTwenty-First Century". ïhat lecture was later published
in Chile in En el Umbrul del Sig10 XXI (EDEVAL, 1989) and reprint4 in Spain in 12-13
Cuademos infomrivos de Derecho Hisrbrico Publico, Procesal, y de In Nuvegucibn 3009
(1990). Because its perspective is that of a U.S. law professor addressing Civil Law scholars,
the essay may be of particular interest to the readership of this review.
(1991) 22 R.G.D. 373-379
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examined in the course of these
arguments.
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principes juridiques. C'est dans ce
contexte qu'il examine l'évolution
tant du droit anglo-américain que
du droit continental.

With recent U.S. academic debates in mind, 1 would like to
discuss the impact of contemporary skepticism on the possibility of a
"science of law", understood in the European sense of systematic
knowledge of a set of legal norms. 1 first present what appears to me to be
the strongest argument in favor of skepticism. 1then tum to the response
of the well-known North American scholar Ronald Dworkin, who tries to
refute the skeptics and to show the possibility of such knowledge - albeit
in a form quite different from that usually found in the Romano-Germanic
world. Finally, 1 present my own reasons for remaining somewhat skeptical.
Already in the last century the American jurist Oliver Wendel1
Holmes, Jr. argued that a judge is often not bound by legal norms, because
these either are quite vague or else are contradictory. Law has no conceptual
uNty knowable by a legal science, being merely a prediction of what such
unfettered judges are likely to say in the future. Holmes' followers (many
of whom were influenced by the nascent social sciences) founded in the
1920's and 30's the American school cailed "Legal Realism," and gave new
impetus to the thesis that "the law is no more than what the judges Say it
is". Some in this school came to affirm that legal niles never, or almost
never, decide cases and that, on the contrary, it is political and psychological
factors that are decisive for the judge. Consequently, they wished to
exchange the traditional methods of legai research and teaching for those
of the new social sciences.' They hoped, indeed, to have many sciences
about law ; but they denied the possibility of a science of law. There cannot
be systematic knowledge of a set of unrelated particulars.
In point of fact the Legal Realists were highly successful:
Although in the last centuly Americans, as well as Europeans, spoke often
about "Legal Science", today these words would be incomprehensible to
a U.S. law student.
One of the best Realist arguments in favor of the lack of coherence
(and so also of comprehensibility) of the body of legal mles was based on
the existence of dissenting opinions. Even the wisest judges often disagree
on what the law requires in a given case. But if these jurists have not made
a mistake of fact or of logic, their disagreement would appear to prove that
the law can dictate contradictory conclusions with equal facility and,
therefore, cannot be intemally coherent. Nor can it be authoritative, for if
1. See, for example, the classic work by Jerome FRANK,
Law and the Modern Mind,
Brentano's Inc.. 1930.
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the law requires two opposite holdings, then it requires neither, and cannot
decide the case in point.
Those early Realists were not revolutionaries, just simple
pragmatic progressives who wished to release judges from the then-dominant
mechanical conceptualism, so that they could be free to confront pressing
societal problems. The Realists did not which to abolish law but to use it
as an instmment to further their own social values. However, in recent years
in the United States a new school has arisen which seeks to draw much more
radical conclusions from the Realist theses. This school calls itself the
"Critical Legal Studies Movement". In his Knowledge and poli tic^,^ and
elsewhere, the genius of the movement, Roberto Mangebeira Unger
(Brazilian, today professor at Harvard Law School) argues that the Realist
critique is incompatible with the liberal polity as we know it.
Liberalism, according to Unger, is an idwlogy requiring a law
that is coherent, complete, and neutral with regard to politics and morals.
It wishes to leave open as large a field of action as possible to individual
interests by restricting law to a set of dry d e s of the game. In order to
promote private planning, the common good must be reduced to a minimum
and specified in advance. Such a political project is much aided by a moral
skepticism and subjectivism that wams the judge not to let any personal (read
"private") normative ideals influence his or her legal judgments.
The fact of moral pluralism seems to confirm and strengthen such
a vision of the mle of law. For if persons of equal intelligence have different
moral opinions, it seems that there must be no accessible morality that is
objective or otherwise universally valid. And in a world without credible
shared values, people must rely more than ever on the public d e s of law.
In Europe and in many parts of the New World, these demands of liberalism
led in the nineteenth century to codification, while in the U.S. other equally
conceptualist forms emerged - such as that of a coherent, neutral, and
binding set of case precedents (the doctrine of stare decisis). Both sides of
the Atlantic claimed that "Legal Science" was now possible.
But now Legal Realism cornes along to say that mles of law do
not exist, or at least that they do not decide cases. Moreover, Realism points
to disagreement about law as a proof of legal subjectivity in a way exactly
parallel to liheralism's use of disagreement about morals as a proof of moral
subjectivity. What decides cases, according to the Realists, are the private
beliefs of the judge; these are imposed ex post facto on parties in
disagreement with him or her. Thus the neutral point above morals and
politics, needed by liberalism, is destroyed hy the Realist critique. What
Europeans tend to cal1 the crisis of statutory law" is in reality a crisis for
al1 law and for liberalism itself. Critical Legal Studies people are pleased
"

2. New York, New York, The Free Press, a division of Macmillan hblkhing Co.,
1975, 2nd edition 1984.
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with this tum of events, for they wish to finish up with liberal society, in
order to construct new communities of types still largely unspecified.
Dworkin's anti-Realist response is based in part upon an earlier
distinction made by H.L.A. Hart in his The Concept of Law,3 that
conceming points of view "intemal" and "external" to law. Hart teaches
that every properly legal affirmation is made from a perspective that takes
as given the obligation to play the legal game - that is, is made from a
perspective "intemal" to law. Only someone intemal can Say "one must
pay this tax" or "one is obligated to report an accident". Somwne external
to law can only describe the opinions of those who are intemal, saying, for
example, "most judges think that you have an obligation to pay taxes and
report accidents". That is, the intemal person can make nomative legal
affirmations while the external person cannot go beyond sociological
description.
Confronted, then, with the Realist thesis and proffered proof of
~ in Law's
legal incoherence, Dworkin in Taking Rights S e n o ~ s l y ,and
E m ~ i r e insists
,~
that law appears so only from an extemal viewpoint. He
challenges the Realist sociologist to sit down on the judicial bench and see
with his or her own eyes whether there is not in fact a best answer for nearly
every legal case or problem, even if other judges on that bench are often
in disagreement, Dworkin says that Our skeptic will end up finding the
answer which seems to be legally most appropriate, and not imposing his
or her own private preferences as to morality - even though moral ideas
will certainly influence this result, a fact that Dworkin does not deny. It is
only from the outside, from the point of view of someone not committed
to playing the legal game, that one can conclude from the fact of
disagreement among judges that the relevant law is incoherent. On the
inside, one may discover that some judges are simply mistaken, despite their
intelligence and good will - with the proviso, of course, that one may
oneself be the one mistaken and, therefore, that one must retain an open mind
on the matter.6 In this way, Dworkin is able to reaffirm the possibility of
a science of law - at least in the sense of a legal theory that may be
redeveloped by each judge, if not in the more enduring sense to which
Europeans have aspired.
1 would say that Dworkin has a good argument here. The Realists
were in fact quite enamored with the emerging social sciences and with the

3. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Prcss), 1961, 2nd edition,
1972.
4. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1978.
5. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Bel Knapp Press (Harvard University Press), 1986.
6. A similar argument has been made by John FINNIS,in Narural LW
and Narural
Righrs, Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, (Oxford University Press), 1980, with regard
to the objectivity of basic moral and natural law judgments.
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goal of a purely factual, non-normative description of law as it "really" is.7
But without assuming a purpose, a telos, there cannot be coherence or
theory, so it is no wonder that these would-be sociologists found none.
What is that finality which ordinarily provides coherence to the
mles of law? There is only one purpose which can be universally ascribed
to al1 those internal to law and therefore can offer help to an all-embracing
Legal Science: the will to be bound, the will to submit, the will to obey the
law. Whatever its ulterior motivation may be, it is this will or aim which
makes one "intemal" to the law in Hart's sense and makes possible
Dworkin's discovery of legal unity. For if the law is to control, it cannot
contain antinomies. One cannot obey two contradictory masters (the truth
in Hans Kelsen's early opposition to "pluralism"). The Realists and their
Critical heirs do not disagree with these assertions. By holding that the law
contains contradictions, they destroy its binding power in logic and in effect.
But it is then also the case that if one begins with a commitment to legal
authority, to the binding quality of law, one cannot fail to presuppose its
latent unity. And given this presupposition, and sufficient time and good
will, a judge will almost always be able to fmd some non-contradicted
principle in law and legal tradition which is able to resolve the case in point,
without (self-consciously at least) imposing his or her personal moral or
political beliefs.
Such a judicial guest is not quixotic. Zfthe law has authority, it
must contain a manifest or hidden unity . The Realists can mock the search
for systematic legal theory only by committing themselves in advance to an
anti-authontarian posture - not by pointing to any correct empirical
description of the world. Dworkin is right from the internal point of view,
and they are right from the extemal point of view. But the choice of point
of view can be determined neither by positive law nor by fact.
This is not first time in history that such conflicts and
misunderstandings have arisen. The mosjuris gallicus (the French Humanist
school of Roman Law study) made similar criticisms of the anterior mosjuris
italicus (the approach of the Glossators and Commentators who first
expounded rediscovered Roman Law to their students in Bologna). The
French ridiculed the Italians for believing in the unity of Roman Law instead
of seeing it from an historicist perspective, as merely a collection of often
unrelateci and contradictory statements uttered over a thousand or more years
of Roman civilization. But of what possible use could the French perspective
have b e n to the professors of Bologna who were attempting to explain the
content of a living system of law, authoritative at least for those subject to
the Holy Roman Empire? A collection of unprincipled and possibly
contradictory mles cannot decide conmete cases. (It is worth noting that even
7. An excellent historical summary of the relationships between Legal Realism and the
new sciences of society can be found in Edward PURCELL,
Ir., 7he Crisis of Dernocrorir
Reoiy, Lexington, Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 1973.
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in France itself, while many scholars followed the French school, judges and
lawyers stayed with the Italian).
Thus a seeming paradox: From the practical imperative to decide
cases according to an authority comes the theoretical effort to develop a
Legal Science. Practical duty requires theoretical science. Sociologists of
law can look with contempt upon the theory of law only if they do not care
about the practice of law.
In saving legal theory, Dworkin claims also to save liberalism.
He shows that, even in difficult and controversial cases, good judges do not
seek to impose their own wills or private opinions, but rather to develop their
distinct visions of what the law is in itself. They are making judgments, not
imposing personal preferences. Thus there need be nothing unfair or
arbitrary in a judge's conclusion that the law comes down on one side of
a case, even if many colleagues might think it settles on the other side. It
is possible for us to go on with that belief, essential to liùeralism, that the
judge is bound and lirnited by the law, even when he or she has recourse
to controversial legal theory. Dworkin rescues liberalism from the
skepticism which threatened to destroy it, by permitting us once again to
stand united as a cornmunity in search of the latent coherence we suppose
to be present in the norms which govern us.
For me, however, a central problem remains. Liùeralism must
at the same time reject and incorporate skepticism about noms. It must reject
skepticism on the legal plane, because it needs to affirm the existence of a
determinative set of mles ovemding the personal and particular values of
each judge. But is requires skepticism on the moral plane, in order to treat
al1 non-legal n o m s as private and subjective, and thus to avoid the revival
of a natural law which might justify additional resirictions on individual
liberties and interests. Dworkin himself holds that human equality and
respect for other persons excludes any attempt to use state power to impose
a moral concept of the good life on those not in agreement with that concept.
Such an imposition, he says, would unfairly use the state to advance the
preferences of some over others. But then why is it not also unfair and a
lack of respect for a judge to impose on others a controversial decision of
law?
Dworkin defends the judge by pointing out that the judge does
not knowingly impose anything personal to himself or herself when deciding
a controversial case: It would indeed be unfair and disrespectful for one to
impose a preference because if is one's own on others, but it is not wrong
for one to impose one's best judgment concerning the meaning of a law
binding all. However, in the moral realrn, too, most of us do not imagine
ourselves to be expressing merely our private feelings or personal
preferences. In al1 humility, we make an effort to render an opinion
concerning what is really the best way to live together. To impose that view
on others may be a mistake, but it is surely not a favoring of ourselves nor
a disrespect for those others.
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Dworkin cannot have it both ways. He cannot be a skeptic with
regard to morality and a believer with regard to law, for it is the same doubt
that assails, and the same faith that strengthens, the one as the other. Either
the fact of disagreement reduces normative judgments to private preferences
or it does not. But whatever it does, it does the same both to law and to
morality.
One way to understand these tensions in Dworkin's work would
be this: Dworkin is seeking to discover the fundamental principles that
undergird liberal politics and law. He correctly observes that in adopting and
enforcing a particular view of those ultimate grounds, one is not favoring
oneself but rather one is impersonally favoring what one supposes to be the
best answers. Nevertheless, this very process leads him to an ultimate liberal
premise which states that al1 ideas of the good are to be treated as personal
preferences. In other words, the content of liberal theory contradicts the
process by which it must be understood and affirmed. It is not Dworkin
himself who is inconsistent. Rather, he has revealed an inconsistency in the
body of thought which he is so profoundly examining.
Liberalism itself contains an antinomy that prevents it from
silencing the skepticism of the heirs of Reaiism, the radicals in the Critical
Legal Studies Movement. Liberalism needs skepticism to liberate ifself from
traditionai moral beliefs and to raise the banner of law as the sole object of
public loyalty. But that same skepticism tums law into the private preference
of each judge. We must choose: either we give up on neutral legal theory,
or we give up on liberalism and begin to speak as seriously about morality
as we do about law. And no matter which we choose, "Legal Science"
becomes a daunting task.

